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1. INTRODUCTION
Witnesses called to testify as "experts" are cloaked with prestige and
authority, and are positioned to exert heavy influence on juries. This is ac-
centuated in areas of expert testimony that are highly technical or specia-
lized. The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that "'[e]xpert
1
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evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty
in evaluating it."'" The Court has therefore given federal trial court judges
the important responsibility of ensuring that expert testimony is based on
reliable methodology and fits the facts of the case. 2 Trial judges are in-
structed to act as "gatekeepers" to prevent juries from being inundated with
"junk science."3
On the other hand, Florida is among a shrinking minority of states still
clinging to the antiquated "Frye test."4 This test does not provide trial judges
with the legal tools for ensuring that "expert" witnesses are qualified and that
their testimony is relevant, reliable, and appropriate for a jury. Instead, the
"test" is nothing more than a determination of whether an expert's methodol-
ogy is "generally accepted." 6  This nebulous standard of "general accep-
tance" is not an adequate check on the integrity of expert evidence. The
problem is compounded by Supreme Court of Florida precedent, holding that
the Frye test applies only to a minority of cases involving expert testimony-
those involving "new science."7 If an expert's testimony is based on science
* Kenneth W. Waterway is a partner in the Fort Lauderdale, Florida office of Sedgwick
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defense and commercial litigation. Mr. Waterway has a regional practice representing primar-
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relating to the qualifications of experts and the reliability of their testimony. Mr. Waterway is
a 1993 graduate of the University of Michigan Law School. He joined the Fort Lauderdale,
Florida predecessor of Sedgwick LLP upon graduation from law school and has spent his
entire career with the firm.
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1. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (quoting Jack B.
Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended,
138 F.R.D. 632 (1991)).
2. Id. at 589, 592.
3. See id. at 597.
4. Spann v. State, 857 So. 2d 845, 852 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); see Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see also Murray v. State, 3 So. 3d 1108, 1117
(Fla.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 396 (2009); Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 547
(Fla. 2007) (per curiam).
5. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
6. Id.
7. Murray, 3 So. 3d at 1117 (citing McDonald v. State, 952 So. 2d 484, 498 (Fla. 2006)
(per curiam)); Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 547-48 (quoting U.S. Sugar Corp. v. Henson, 823 So. 2d
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that the court does not deem "new" or derived from a field that is not tradi-
tionally "science," then the test is not even triggered.8 So-called "pure opi-
nion" testimony purportedly based on an expert's overall experience is also
beyond the reach of the Frye test.9
This shortcoming in Florida jurisprudence undermines the integrity of
the court system and the quality of justice dispensed by trial courts. It also
threatens to diminish the state's many advantages in attracting business, par-
ticularly in light of the fact that most states in the Southeast have already
modernized their laws governing the admissibility of expert evidence, in-
cluding Georgia by legislation enacted in 2005.o
The Florida Legislature can and should solve this problem by statutorily
adopting the "Daubert test" to place Florida on equal footing with most other
jurisdictions and federal courts.
104, 109 (Fla. 2002)); Spann, 857 So. 2d at 852 (citing Henson, 823 So. 2d at 109; Brim v.
State, 695 So. 2d 268, 271-72 (Fla. 1997)).
8. See Murray, 3 So. 3d at 1117 (citing McDonald, 952 So. 2d at 498); Marsh, 977 So.
2d at 547-48 (quoting Henson, 823 So. 2d at 109); Spann, 857 So. 2d at 852.
9. Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 548, 561 (citing Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla.
1993)); Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 579-80 (Fla. 1997) (citing Flanagan, 625 So. 2d at
828).
10. See infra notes 114, 116, 117. The Georgia Legislature first adopted the Daubert test
of admissibility in 2005. See GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-67.1(f) (2010); Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993). Subsequently, a Georgia trial court found portions
of subsections (a) and (b)(1) and subsection (f) of the statute unconstitutional, and severed
them from the statute as a whole. Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. (Mason 1), No. 97-A-
5105-1, 2006 WL 6057895, at *7-9 (Ga. Cobb County State Ct. Oct. 6, 2006), vacated in
part, 658 S.E.2d 603 (Ga. 2008). On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia agreed with the
severance of sections (a) and (b)(1), but disagreed with the trial court's analysis and severance
of section (f), Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. (Mason II), 658 S.E.2d 603, 608-09 (Ga.
2008), which referenced Daubert and stated:
"It is the intent of the legislature that, in all civil cases, the courts of the State of Georgia not be
viewed as open to expert evidence that would not be admissible in other states. Therefore, in
interpreting and applying this Code section, the courts of this state may draw from the opinions
of the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993); General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.
136, 118 S. Ct. 512, 139 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S.
137, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 143 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1999); and other cases in federal courts applying the
standards announced by the United States Supreme Court in these cases."
Mason II, 658 S.E.2d at 605-06 n.1, 608-09 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-67.1(f)). In its
holding, the Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that "the trial court was mistaken in declar-
ing subsection (f) unconstitutional." Id. at 609. Most recently, the Georgia Legislature has
proposed new legislation to take the place of section 24-9-67.1. See GA. CODE ANN. § 24-7-
702 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). Like the previous statute, the proposed legislation
incorporates the same Daubert standard of admissibility and reaffirms Georgia's adherence to
Daubert. Id. § 24-7-702(f).
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Part II of this article discusses the inherent failings of the Frye test as
applied and interpreted by Florida courts. Part m of this article focuses on
the components of the Daubert test and the particular need for the test in
professional liability cases. Part IV of this article examines the prior legisla-
tive attempts to adopt a statutory Daubert standard in Florida. Finally, Part
V proposes a bill for the legislature to consider in the upcoming legislative
session to implement a Daubert standard in Florida state courts.
II. THE PROBLEM: FLORIDA LACKS ADEQUATE MEANS FOR ENSURING
EXPERT EVIDENCE Is TRUSTWORTHY
A. Overview
The modern jury trial is likely to feature scientific or technical issues
too complex for jurors to understand and decide solely on the basis of per-
sonal knowledge and experience. While juries usually function well using
their collective memories and assessing credibility, the same cannot be said
for understanding and deciding complex scientific or technical issues. In-
deed, for this very reason parties are permitted to offer testimony from "ex-
perts" on such issues." Jurors may place a great deal of reliance on expert
witnesses, so it is imperative that an expert witness have true expertise on the
issues at hand. 12
Our legal system has long grappled with the challenge of expert testi-
mony that does not meet minimum thresholds of reliability and relevance.13
The federal system and many states have seen excellent progress in this area
11. FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (2011). Section 90.702 of the Florida Statutes provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact in understand-
ing the evidence or in determining a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by know-
ledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify about it in the form of an opinion;
however, the opinion is admissible only if it can be applied to evidence at trial.
Id.
12. Flanagan, 625 So. 2d at 828. In the words of the Supreme Court of Florida, "[t]he
jury will naturally assume that the scientific principles underlying the expert's conclusions are
valid." Id.; see, e.g., Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 561 (Cantero, J., dissenting) (quoting Flanagan,
625 So. 2d at 828); Ramirez v. State (Ramirez III), 810 So. 2d 836, 844 (Fla. 2001) (quoting
Flanagan, 625 So. 2d at 828); Hadden, 690 So. 2d at 578 (quoting Flanagan, 625 So. 2d at
828); Holy Cross Hosp., Inc. v. Marrone, 816 So. 2d 1113, 1118 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
(citing Flanagan, 625 So. 2d at 828); Kaelbel Wholesale, Inc. v. Soderstrom, 785 So. 2d 539,
547 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Flanagan, 625 So. 2d at 828).
13. See Kaminski v. State, 63 So. 2d 339, 340 (Fla. 1952) (per curiam) (applying the
Frye standard to test the reliability of the foundation of the expert's testimony); see also Cop-
polino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68, 70-71 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (establishing that Florida
officially adopted the Frye standard as a way to ensure that evidence was "sufficiently reliable
to justify [its] admission").
[Vol. 364
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within current generations of judges and lawyers.'4 A federal circuit judge
surveying the situation in 1986 made the following assessment:
[E]xperts whose opinions are available to the highest bidder have
no place testifying in a court of law. . . . We will turn to that task
with a sharp eye, particularly in those instances . . . where . . . the
decision to receive expert testimony was simply tossed off to the
jury under a "let it all in" philosophy. Our message to our able tri-
al colleagues: [I]t is time to take hold of expert testimony in fed-
eral trials.15
This call to action was followed by dramatic change at the federal level,
both in awareness of the problem and the implementation of solutions.16
Most states have followed suit." Florida has not.'8
Rather, Florida is increasingly isolated as a jurisdiction yoked to a "test"
for expert witness testimony created in 1923.'9 The Supreme Court of Flori-
da continually reaffirms the state's adherence to the 1923 test,20 and as a re-
sult the state's trial judges are bound to "let it all in" in all but the rarest of
cases.21
There are demonstrable effects of Florida's out-dated approach to ex-
pert evidence. In 2010, Florida ranked forty-second in the overall fairness of
its litigation environment, and ranked thirty-ninth in its treatment of scientif-
ic and technical evidence in a poll of state liability systems surveying nearly
1500 general counsel and senior corporate attorneys familiar with the state
14. See, e.g., Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589; United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151, 161 (2d
Cir. 2007); Eymard v. Pan Am. World Airways (In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans),
795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986); Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319, 328-29 (Okla. Crim. App.
1995).
15. In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, 795 F.2d at 1234.
16. See, e.g., Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997); Daubert, 509 U.S. at
589.
17. See infra pp. 21-23 and notes 113-45.
18. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 62 So. 3d 1101, 1110-11 (Fla. 2011) (per curiam); Murray
v. State, 3 So. 3d 1108, 1117 (Fla.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 396 (2009) (citing
McDonald v. State, 952 So. 2d 484, 498 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam)); Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So.
2d 543, 546-50 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam); Spann v. State, 857 So. 2d 845, 852 (Fla. 2003) (per
curiam).
19. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013-14 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
20. See, e.g., Taylor, 62 So. 3d at 1110; Murray, 3 So. 3d at 1117; Marsh, 977 So. 2d at
546-50; Spann, 857 So. 2d at 852.
21. See, e.g., Janssen Pharm. Prods., L.P. v. Hodgemire, 49 So. 3d 767, 771-72 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam), review denied, 64 So. 3d 1260 (Fla. 2011); Gelsthorpe ex
rel. Bacus v. Weinstein, 897 So. 2d 504, 509 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Kaelbel Whole-
sale, Inc. v. Soderstrom, 785 So. 2d 539, 546 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
52011]1
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litigation environments.22 Florida annually scores well overall in business
climate and prospects for growth, but less well in regulatory/legal environ-
ment.23 In Forbes' 2007 Best States for Business rankings, for example,
Florida placed in the top ten overall but scored lower on regulatory environ-
ment and below average on business costs.24 By contrast, Georgia, which
passed expert evidence reform legislation in 2005, scored in the top five on
regulatory environment.25 Currently, Florida's rank has dropped all the way
to number twenty-six. 26  Florida-South Florida in particular-routinely
appears in business and legal interest rankings of the worst "judicial hell-
holes" in the nation. 27  For 2010-2011, according to the American Tort
Reform Foundation, South Florida ranks as one of the top six worst judicial
hellholes in the United States.28
B. Good Science Makes Good Law
It should not be controversial to suggest that judges and juries will
struggle to make fair and accurate decisions if invalid science or technical
information distorts their understanding of the facts. On the other hand, reli-
able expert testimony will increase the quality of justice. 29 Good science
makes good law. This is a point that should find broad acceptance among
the stakeholders in Florida's justice system.
Whether one starts with consideration of the rationale underpinning
federal decisions, led by the 1993 opinion of the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,30 or the current
state of Florida common law regarding expert testimony, the conclusion is
the same: it is imperative that Florida's Legislature adopt progressive legis-
22. HARRIS INTERACTIVE, 2010 U.S. Chamber of Commerce State Liability Systems
Ranking Study, U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM 1, 7, 42 (Mar. 9, 2010),
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/sites/default/files/images2/stories/documents/pdf/laws
uitclimate2010/201 FullHarrisSurvey.pdf.
23. Kurt Badenhausen, The Best States for Business and Careers, FORBES.COM (Oct. 13,
2010, 6:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/10/13/best-states-for-business-business-beltway
-best-states-table.html.
24. Kurt Badenhausen, The Best States for Business, FORBES.COM (July 11, 2007, 6:00
AM), http://www.forbes.com/2007/07/10/washington-virginia-utah-biz-cz kb_071lbizstates-
table.html.
25. Id.
26. Badenhausen, supra note 23.
27. See, e.g., Judicial Hellholes, AM. TORT REFORM FOUND. 1, 8-10 (2010), http://www.
judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/JH20 I 0.pdf.
28. Id. at 3.
29. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319, 329 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
30. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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lation governing the disclosure, qualifications, and reliability of expert testi-
mony in litigation. Such legislation would equip Florida trial judges with
specific benchmarks for evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony.
This would vastly improve the level of science and the quality of expert tes-
timony in Florida courts. The Supreme Court of the United States was moti-
vated by a concern for good science in Daubert, when it gave federal trial
court judges the important responsibility of ensuring that expert testimony
presented in court is based on reliable methodology and fits the facts of the
case.3' Federal trial judges are made "gatekeepers" of expert evidence to
prevent juries from being misled by junk science.32 The Supreme Court of
Florida has not followed the same path, and Florida trial judges are extreme-
ly limited in their ability to keep junk science and unreliable or irrelevant
expert evidence out of court.33
Good science makes good law, and Florida's lawmakers need to enact
legislation that will maximize the likelihood that only good science is fac-
tored into the case-by-case law made in Florida's courts.
C. Florida's 1923 Frye "General Acceptance" Test
Frye v. United StateS34 dealt with the admissibility of a blood pressure
"deception test."35 In this criminal case, the defendant appealed his convic-
tion for second degree murder based on the trial court's exclusion of expert
testimony on the result of the test on the defendant. 36 The defendant at-
tempted to convince the court to allow the expert testimony based on the
following:
It is asserted that blood pressure is influenced by change in the
emotions of the witness, and that the systolic blood pressure rises
31. Id. at 592-93.
32. See id. at 597.
33. See, e.g., State v. Demeniuk, 888 So. 2d 655, 658 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (cit-
ing Sybers v. State, 841 So. 2d 532, 542 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003) ("Frye requires that the
judge perform the function of gatekeeper. In general terms, the gate of admissibility is not
opened unless the proponent of new scientific evidence can demonstrate by the greater weight
of the evidence that the scientific principle upon which the evidence is based, and the testing
procedures used to apply the principle to the facts of the case, have gained general acceptance
for reliability among impartial and disinterested experts within the particular scientific com-
munity to which the principle belongs.")).
34. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
35. Id. at 1013.
36. Id. at 1013-14. Ostensibly, defendant's counsel wished to introduce the results of the
test to show that the defendant was truthful on questions relating to his commission of the
crime. Id. at 1014.
2011]1 7
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are brought about by nervous impulses sent to the sympathetic
branch of the autonomic nervous system. Scientific experiments,
it is claimed, have demonstrated that fear, rage, and pain always
produce a rise of systolic blood pressure, and that conscious decep-
tion or falsehood, concealment of facts, or guilt of crime, accom-
panied by fear of detection when the person is under examination,
raises the systolic blood pressure in a curve, which corresponds
exactly to the struggle going on in the subject's mind, between fear
and attempted control of that fear, as the examination touches the
vital points in respect of which he is attempting to deceive the ex-
aminer. 37
The court summarized the defendant's theory as: "[T]ruth is spontane-
ous, and comes without conscious effort, while the utterance of a falsehood
requires a conscious effort, which is reflected in the blood pressure."3 8 The
defendant did not appear to cite to any cases, scientific studies, or medical
literature to directly support his theory.39
In ruling that the test results were not admissible, the court fashioned a
requirement of "general acceptance" for "the thing from which the [expert's]
deduction is made." 40 The Frye court's reasoning was contained in a single
paragraph lacking citation to any legal authority:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line be-
tween the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to de-
fine. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduc-
tion is made must be sufficiently established to have gained gener-
al acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.41
Frye is now almost ninety years old.42 Its general acceptance test to
guide courts in discerning trustworthiness in the "twilight zone" of science
seems to have had an appealing simplicity in simpler times.43  Florida
37. Id. at 1013-14.
38. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
39. Id. The opinion only referenced the fact that "no cases directly [o]n point have been
found." Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Frye, 293 F. at 1013.
43. See id. at 1014; infra notes 44, 113-57 and accompanying text.
8 [Vol. 36
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adopted the general acceptance test in 1952." Most other states adhered to
Frye for much of the twentieth century.45
The Supreme Court of Florida imposes four steps on trial judges in its
articulation of the Frye test:
1) [Tihe trial judge must determine whether such expert testimony
will assist the jury in understanding the evidence or in determining
a fact in issue; 2) the trial judge must decide whether the expert's
testimony is based on a scientific principle or discovery that is
"sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs;" 3) the trial judge [must] de-
termine whether a particular witness is qualified as an expert to
present opinion testimony on the subject in issue; 4) the [trial]
judge may then allow the expert to render an opinion on the sub-
ject of his or her expertise, and it is then up to the jury to deter-
mine the credibility of the expert's opinion, which it may either
accept or reject.46
In the decades since Florida adopted Frye, however, its courts have ri-
gidly upheld the general acceptance test in concept, while at the same time
narrowing its applicability to a small fraction of the cases involving expert
testimony. 47 The Supreme Court of Florida's 2007 decision in Marsh v. Va-
lyou48 exemplifies an essentially unbroken line of cases proclaiming that
Florida follows the general acceptance test but restricting the test's reach to
the point of near non-usability.49 The Frye test has been rendered an anoma-
ly by scores of Florida decisions embracing the concepts of "pure opinion"
44. See Kaminski v. State, 63 So. 2d 339, 340 (Fla. 1952) (per curiam).
45. See infra notes 112-57 and accompanying text. For example, Alaska originally
adopted the Frye test of admissibility in 1970 in Pulakis v. State, 476 P.2d 474, 478-79
(Alaska 1970), overruled by State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1999), but later found that
the Frye test was outdated and decided to replace it with the federal Daubert test in 1999. See
Coon, 974 P.2d at 402 (adopting Daubert).
46. Ramirez v. State (Ramirez II), 651 So. 2d 1164, 1166-67 (Fla. 1995) (citations omit-
ted).
47. Compare Kaminski, 63 So. 2d at 340, with Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 551
(Fla. 2007) (per curiam).
48. 977 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam).
49. See id. at 546-51; see also Taylor v. State, 62 So. 3d 1101, 1110-11 (Fla. 2011) (per
curiam); Murray v. State, 3 So. 3d 1108, 1117 (Fla.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 396
(2009); Overton v. State, 976 So. 2d 536, 550 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting Ramirez 11,
651 So. 2d at 1168); Rodgers v. State, 948 So. 2d 655, 666 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam) (quoting
Frye, 293 F. at 1014); Zack v. State, 911 So. 2d 1190, 1197-98 (Fla. 2005) (per curiam) (cit-
ing Frye, 293 F. at 1014; Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268, 271 (Fla. 1997)).
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and "methodology vs. reasoning and conclusion" and "new or novel science"
as touchstones of the applicability of the general acceptance requirement.so
1. Florida's Frye Rule Does Not Apply to an Expert's "Pure Opinion"
Florida courts have held that an expert can testify to his or her "pure
opinion" without satisfying any general acceptance test." This begs the
question of when an opinion is "pure" as opposed to the alternative-
whatever that is-and a leading case offers this explanation: "'Pure opinion'
refers to expert opinion developed from inductive reasoning based on the
experts' own experience, observation, or research, whereas the Frye test ap-
plies when an expert witness reaches a conclusion by deduction, from apply-
ing new and novel scientific principle, formula, or procedure developed by
others."52 As one commentator noted, this "pure opinion" doctrine incenti-
vizes reliance on one's own "experience" and "personal observation" to the
detriment of research of actual scientific endeavor reflected in the published
50. See, e.g., Murray, 3 So. 3d at 1117; Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 548; Castillo v. E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 854 So. 2d 1264, 1276 (Fla. 2003).
51. See, e.g., Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 548 ("It is well-established that Frye is inapplicable to
'pure opinion' testimony .... ); Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 579 (Fla. 1997) ("[Tjhe
Frye standard for admissibility of scientific evidence is not applicable to an expert's pure
opinion testimony . . . ." (citing Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla. 1993)); Flana-
gan, 625 So. 2d at 828 ("[P]ure opinion testimony ... does not have to meet Frye . . . ."); see
also Kaminski, 63 So. 2d at 340; Torres v. State, 999 So. 2d 1077, 1079 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2009) (finding "the expert's testimony to be pure opinion, not subject to Frye "); Burton
v. State (In re Commitment of Burton), 884 So. 2d 1112, 1113 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004);
Jones v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 871 So. 2d 899, 903 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003)
(citing Rickgauer v. Sarkar, 804 So. 2d 502, 504 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001)); Fla. Power &
Light Co. v. Tursi, 729 So. 2d 995, 997 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Flanagan, 625
So. 2d at 828).
52. Holy Cross Hosp., Inc. v. Marrone, 816 So. 2d 1113, 1117 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2001) (citing Kuhn ex rel. Estate of Bishop v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 14 P.3d 1170, 1179 (Kan.
2000)); Hadden, 690 So. 2d at 579-80 (stating that an expert's testimony is pure opinion when
it "is based solely on the expert's training and experience"); Flanagan, 625 So. 2d at 828
("[P]ure opinion testimony ... is based on the expert's personal experience and training.");
Torres, 999 So. 2d at 1078-79 ("[T]estimony based entirely on the expert's professional expe-
rience constituted 'pure opinion' . . . [because it] did not rely on scientific studies, syndrome
evidence, diagnostic criteria, or any other classic scientific test." The expert "limited the basis
for his testimony to his own professional experience."); Johnson v. State, 933 So. 2d 568, 570
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006) ("An expert opinion based on personal training and experience
is not subject to a Frye analysis." (citing Herlihy v. State, 927 So. 2d 146, 147 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 2006) (per curiam))); Davis v. Caterpillar, Inc., 787 So. 2d 894, 898 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2001) (admitting expert opinion where the expert testified how to make a dangerous
condition safer based solely on his experience).
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or reported work of others." For example, if an expert uses "scientific litera-
ture as a tool in helping form an opinion, then the court can and will scrutin-
ize that opinion under Frye," but if the expert chooses to give an expert opi-
nion without any basis in scientific literature at all, then his opinion is not
subjected to the Frye test and is likely admissible.54 It seems entirely "coun-
terintuitive to permit an expert to ignore scientific literature accepted by the
general scientific community in favor of the expert's personal experience to
reach a conclusion not generally recognized in the scientific community and
then allow testimony about that conclusion on the basis that it is pure opi-
nion." 5 Yet, despite the obvious deficiencies in the Frye exception for "pure
opinion" testimony, the Supreme Court of Florida continues to affirm alle-
giance to it."
2. Florida's Frye Rule Does Not Apply to an Expert's Reasoning or
Conclusion
Frye's application is limited to an expert's methodology and scientific
principles, and a judge is forbidden to apply the general acceptance test to an
expert's reasoning or conclusions." The Supreme Court of Florida has in
fact, more or less, prohibited judges confronted with a challenge to expert
testimony from considering the reliability of an expert's reasoning or the
connection between an expert's conclusions and the underlying principles.
53. See Neil D. Kodsi, Confronting Experts Whose Opinions Are Neither Supported nor
Directly Contradicted by Scientific Literature, FLA. B.J., June 2006, at 80; see also Tursi, 729
So. 2d at 996-97 (allowing a doctor to testify that exposure to a chemical caused a patient's
cataracts despite the fact that the expert used absolutely no scientific data to support the
theory).
54. Kodsi, supra note 53.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 561 (Cantero, J., dissenting); Hadden, 690 So. 2d at
580-81; Flanagan, 625 So. 2d at 828.
57. See, e.g., Castillo v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 854 So. 2d 1264, 1276 (Fla.
2003) (stating that "Frye does not require the court to assess the application of the expert's raw
data in reaching his or her conclusion," but only requires that the underlying science is gener-
ally accepted); Janssen Pharm. Prods., L.P. v. Hodgemire, 49 So. 3d 767, 771 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam), review denied, 64 So. 3d 1260 (Fla. 2011); Gelsthorpe ex rel.
Bacus v. Weinstein, 897 So. 2d 504, 509 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Kaelbel Wholesale,
Inc. v. Soderstrom, 785 So. 2d 539, 547 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
58. See Castillo, 854 So. 2d at 1276 (stating that Frye looks only at the validity of the
underlying science, and derogating the court below for engaging in essentially a federal analy-
sis that questioned the expert's methodology and reasoning); see also Rodgers v. State, 948
So. 2d 655, 666 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam) (reaffirming the Castillo opinion and stating that the
Frye test only should be applied to the underlying principles or methodology and not to the
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3. Florida's Frye Rule Does Not Apply Unless the Expert's Testimony
Involves "New or Novel Science"
Finally, as applied in Florida, the Frye test is only invoked in cases in-
volving "new or novel scientific evidence."59 No Florida court has or can
reasonably define "new or novel" in the context of science, but courts have
found that enhancement of operator visibility on sophisticated construction
equipment,60 handwriting analysis, 6 1 footprint analysis, 62 tire thickness, 63
global positioning satellite technology,64 and even basic DNA analysis 65 are
not new or novel and are therefore immune from scrutiny under Frye.6 6 In-
deed, a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Florida declared that "in the
vast majority of cases, no Frye inquiry will be required."67
D. Life Under Frye-Expert Evidence Seldom Challenged, Rarely
Scrutinized
A historian might say that the Frye general acceptance test was typical
Roaring-Twenties hubris. Much closer in vintage to the flight of the Wright
brothers than to the Apollo landing, the Frye test is a Prohibition-era relic
that continues to short-change most of the stakeholders in Florida's judicial
system.68 In Florida, there is virtually no stopping a lawyer who seeks to
opinion itself because the credibility of the expert opinion does not implicate the Frye test, but
instead goes to the weight of the evidence).
59. See, e.g., Murray v. State, 3 So. 3d 1108, 1117 (Fla.) (per curiam) (quoting McDo-
nald v. State, 952 So. 2d 484, 498 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam)), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 396
(2009); Overton v. State, 976 So. 2d 536, 550 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam); Rodgers, 948 So. 2d at
666; Branch v. State, 952 So. 2d 470, 483 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam) (citing Brim v. State, 695
So. 2d 268, 271-72 (Fla. 1997)); lbar v. State, 938 So. 2d 451, 467 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam);
Zack v. State, 911 So. 2d 1190, 1198 (Fla. 2005) (per curiam) (citing Brim, 695 So. 2d at 271-
72); Still v. State, 917 So. 2d 250, 251 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Brim, 695 So. 2d
at 271-72); Jones v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 871 So. 2d 899, 902 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2003) (citing U.S. Sugar Corp. v. Henson, 823 So. 2d 104, 109 (Fla. 2002).
60. Davis v. Caterpillar, Inc., 787 So. 2d 894, 898-99 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
61. Spann v. State, 857 So. 2d 845, 851-52 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam).
62. Ibar, 938 So. 2d at 468.
63. Jones, 871 So. 2d at 903.
64. Still, 917 So. 2d at 251.
65. Hayes v. State, 660 So. 2d 257, 264-65 (Fla. 1995).
66. Ibar, 938 So. 2d at 468; Spann, 857 So. 2d at 852; Hayes, 660 So. 2d at 264-65; Still,
917 So. 2d at 251; Jones, 871 So. 2d at 903; Davis v. Caterpillar, Inc., 787 So. 2d 894, 898-99
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
67. U.S. Sugar Corp. v. Henson, 823 So. 2d 104, 109 (Fla. 2002) (emphasis added).
68. See Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 548 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam). The exception
might be criminal defendants, for whom Frye seems to have provided a fertile appellate field;
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influence the jury with a "hired gun" expert espousing junk science-the
lawyer merely needs to aim for one of the gaping holes in Frye's applicabili-
ty:69
Challenged testimony
is "pure opinion"
Challenged testimony
is "reasoning or con-
clusion"
Challenged testimony
is not "new or novel
science"
NO
NO
Even the expert who fails to avoid the application of Frye can still satis-
fy the general acceptance test by purporting to base his or her testimony on
the principles of some recognized field.70 Such a standard, with so many
some examples in this regard include the Supreme Court of Florida's rejection under Frye of a
psychologist's "sex offender profile," Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla. 1993); a psy-
chologist's testimony on "child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome," Hadden v. State, 690
So. 2d 573, 575 (Fla. 1997); "hypnotically refreshed testimony," Stokes v. State, 548 So. 2d 188,
195-96 (Fla. 1989); and an expert on the marks made by the blade of a knife, Ramirez v. State
(Ramirez 1), 542 So. 2d 352, 355 (Fla. 1989) (per curiam).
69. See, e.g., Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 560-61 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
70. See id. at 546-47 (majority opinion).
Does the Frye general
acceptance test apply to challenged
expert testimony?
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exceptions, is really no standard at all and offers trial courts no consistent,
objective measure for admitting expert testimony. While the Frye test as
originally stated was simple, the case law eroding its application in a host of
contexts has made it very difficult to apply."
The unsurprising result of Florida being a Frye jurisdiction is that it is
all too rare for expert evidence to be subjected to rigorous scrutiny in Florida
courts.72 A party has little incentive to challenge an opponent's expert re-
gardless of how questionable the expert's opinions might be.73 Unfortunate-
ly, making a Frye challenge in Florida is usually roughly equivalent to
coaching the challenged expert-and retaining counsel-on his or her vulne-
rabilities and telegraphing the likely thrust of cross-examination at trial.
Most Florida attorneys, therefore, tend to make the pragmatic, but unsatisfy-
ing choice of forgoing Frye challenges, even when facing an expert who
should be challenged and who would be challenged under a better system.74
E. The Entrenchment of Frye in the Supreme Court of Florida
Florida's appellate courts have had several opportunities to modernize
and improve the way expert evidence is dealt with at trial, but their adhe-
rence to Frye has never wavered. Instead, as noted above, the test has been
consistently honored in name, but construed in a manner that renders it tooth-
less.76 Consequently, the harm is compounded-an evidentiary safeguard
that is woefully inadequate to begin with, becomes an open floodgate in ap-
plication.
Supreme Court of Florida decisions reflect that Frye is now so en-
trenched in Florida precedent that it is unrealistic to believe that the judicial
system will solve Florida's expert evidence problem from within. In 2007,
the Court decided Marsh with five of seven justices reaffirming Frye as the
law of Florida.78 A majority of four ruled that Frye does not even apply to
expert testimony causally linking trauma to fibromyalgia.79 More signifi-
71. See id. at 547. "The Frye test is simple to state, if not always easy to apply." Id. at
560 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
72. See id. at 547, 550 (majority opinion).
73. See Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 547-48, 550.
74. See id. at 546-47, 549.
75. Id. at 547. The Supreme Court of Florida appears to have first adopted Frye almost
sixty years ago in 1952. See Kaminski v. State, 63 So. 2d 339, 340 (Fla. 1952) (per curiam)
(applying the Frye standard to test the reliability of the foundation of the expert's testimony).
76. See Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 547.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 547, 551.
79. Id. at 549-50.
[Vol. 3614
14
Nova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 2
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol36/iss1/2
A PLEA FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
cantly, the majority recognized that the Frye test "is inapplicable in the vast
majority of cases" because it applies only to "new or novel" science.so The
majority also stated that the test is likewise "inapplicable to 'pure opinion'
testimony," and in a medical context, for example, this exempts from the test
a causation opinion based solely on a purported expert's "experience and
training."8'
As the dissent recognized, these gaping holes in the Frye test's applica-
bility threaten to swallow the test itself, and in effect, render expert testimo-
ny "always admissible as. . . 'pure opinion."'82 But, it was not just the dis-
sent that recognized the flaws in the Frye test; the concurring opinion au-
thored by Justice Anstead-and joined by Justice Pariente-expressed the
view that Frye was superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence and that the
Florida Supreme Court should adopt Daubert as consistent with Florida's
Rules of Evidence.83 Justice Anstead also pointed out that the Supreme
Court of Florida has "never explained how Frye has survived the adoption of
the rules of evidence."84
The Marsh decision came at a point in time when pro-business interests
probably saw the zenith of a favorable composition of the Supreme Court of
Florida. 5 Given this fact and the bulwark of unbroken adherence to Frye
emanating from the Florida Supreme Court for decades, Marsh is likely to be
the high-water mark-as close as the court is likely to come to changing this
aspect of Florida law.
1H. SOLUTION: BRING DAUBERTTO FLORIDA THROUGH LEGISLATIVE
CHANGE
A. The Daubert Approach
In its 1993 Daubert decision, the Supreme Court of the United States
created a seismic shift in the test for the admissibility of expert testimony.
Daubert held that Congress' adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence dis-
places the general acceptance test and requires the federal trial judge to en-
80. Id. at 547 (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 548 (quoting Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla.
1993)).
82. Id. at 562 (Cantero, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 551, 554 (Anstead, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 551.
85. The three dissenting justices in Marsh-Cantero, Wells, and Bell-are no longer on
the Supreme Court of Florida.
86. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
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sure that any expert testimony admitted is both reliable and relevant." The
Court has also clarified that an expert's conclusions are not beyond the reach
of the relevance/reliability test,"8 and that the relevance/reliability test is not
limited to the "scientific" and applies to all expert testimony. 9
The discussion below focuses on the reliability and relevance prongs of
the Daubert test, the trial judge's continuing role as "gatekeeper" under this
test, and the number of states that have embraced the Daubert test.
1. Reliability
Reliability is determined on the basis of flexible factors, which typically
include, at a minimum: 1) whether the conclusion or methodology being
espoused is subject to being tested; 2) whether the conclusion or methodolo-
gy has been subjected to peer review and publication, such that substantive
flaws will likely have been flushed out; 3) whether there exists standards
controlling the methodology's operation, and, if so, the known or potential
rate of error; and 4) whether the conclusion or methodology is generally ac-
cepted.90
Additionally, the Daubert approach encourages a trial judge to consider
whether an expert is offering opinions that are consistent with the expert's
work outside the courtroom.9' Consistency between what an expert has said
on a subject in litigation and non-litigation contexts is an indicator of relia-
bility; in contrast, courts are rightfully suspicious of the expert who opines
on a subject only when hired to do so in lawsuits.92
The Daubert approach also embraces the notion that given the fluidity
and complexity of science and other disciplines giving rise to expertise,
87. Id.
88. Although Daubert spoke of "theory or technique" as opposed to "conclusion," the
Court's holding in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997), recognized that
conclusions are properly scrutinized, and that courts should not permit conclusions tied to data
only by the expert's ipse dixit (i.e., "because I said it").
89. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999).
90. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
91. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995).
92. See id. ("[E]xperts whose findings flow from existing research are less likely to have
been biased toward a particular conclusion by the promise of remuneration; when an expert
prepares reports and findings before being hired as a witness, that record will limit the degree
to which he can tailor his testimony to serve a party's interests."); see also McCorvey v. Bax-
ter Healthcare Corp., No. 99-1250-CIV, 2008 WL 8095712, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2008);
Haggerty v. UpJohn Co., 950 F. Supp. 1160, 1162 (S.D. Fla. 1996); Reynard ex rel. Estate of
Reynard v. NEC Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1500, 1507 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
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courts should be able to consider a variety of factors in any given case.93
Some of the additional factors expressly recognized include: 1) "[w]hether
the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted premise to an un-
founded conclusion;" 94 2) "[w]hether the expert has adequately accounted for
obvious alternative explanations;" 95 3) whether the expert is being as careful
93. See FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note (stating that the "standards set forth
in the amendment [to Rule 702] are broad enough to require consideration of any or all of the
specific Daubert factors where appropriate" and that other factors can and should be applied
where necessary (emphasis added)).
94. Id.; see, e.g., Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 157 (quoting Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner,
522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)) (following Daubert and stating that a trial court is not required to
admit "evidence that is connected to [the] data only by the ipse dixit of the expert."); Joiner,
522 U.S. at 146 (stating that a trial court may exclude evidence where it finds that "there is
simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered" for the evi-
dence to be admissible); Hendrix ex rel. G.P. v. Evenflo Co., 609 F.3d 1183, 1194 (11th Cir.
2010) (quoting Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146) (finding that there is nothing in either Daubert or the
Federal Rules of Evidence that requires the trial court to admit an expert's opinion "that is
connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert."); Guinn v. AstraZeneca Pharm.
L.P., 602 F.3d 1245, 1255 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (upholding the district court's exclu-
sion of an expert's testimony because the expert failed to show how her opinions were logical-
ly derived from the facts of the case); Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe
Cnty., Fla., 402 F.3d 1092, 1112 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming the trial court's exclusion of an
expert's opinion because the opinion was "unsubstantiated by any proffered facts, explanation,
or analysis."); McClain v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1255 (11 th Cir. 2005)
("Plaintiffs' experts took leaps of faith and substituted their own ipse dixit for scientific proof
on essential points."); Rink v. Cheminova, Inc., 400 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11 th Cir. 2005) (ex-
plaining that the expert's opinion "required the kind of scientifically unsupported 'leap of
faith' which is condemned by Daubert." (citation omitted)); Fuesting v. Zimmer, Inc., 362 F.
App'x 560, 562-63 (7th Cir. 2010); Bland v. Verizon Wireless, (VAW) L.L.C., 538 F.3d 893,
898 (8th Cir. 2008); Smith v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 232 F. App'x 780, 782 (10th Cir. 2007);
Anderson v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 406 F.3d 248, 263 (4th Cir. 2005); Ammons
v. Aramark Unif. Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 815 (7th Cir. 2004); Montgomery Cnty. v. Mi-
crovote Corp., 320 F.3d 440, 448 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146); Phelan v.
Synthes (U.S.A.), 35 F. App'x 102, 106-07 (4th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); J.B. Hunt Transp.,
Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 243 F.3d 441, 444 (8th Cir. 2001); Holesapple v. Barrett, 5 F.
App'x 177, 179-80 (4th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 158
(3d Cir. 2000 overruled on other grounds Soufflas v. Zimmer, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 737 (E.D.
Pa. 2007)); Cooper ex rel. Estate of Cooper v. Carl A. Nelson & Co., 211 F.3d 1008, 1021
(7th Cir. 2000); Jaurequi v. Carter Mfg. Co., 173 F.3d 1076, 1084 (8th Cir. 1999); Heller v.
Shaw Indus., 167 F.3d 146, 153-59 (3d Cir. 1999); Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of P.R. Bottling
Co., 161 F.3d 77, 81-82 (1st Cir. 1998); Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 279
(5th Cir. 1998); Schudel v. Gen. Electric Co., 120 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 1997); Turpin v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1360 (6th Cir. 1992); Washburn v. Merck & Co.,
No. 99-9121, 2000 WL 528649, at *627 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2000) (unpublished table decision).
95. FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note; see also Davis v. City of Loganville,
No. 3:04-CV-068 (CAR), 2006 WL 826713, at *11 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 2006) (11th Circuit
case); Lauzon v. Senco Prods., Inc., 270 F.3d 681, 694 (8th Cir. 2001) (discussing that an
expert must "explain why other conceivable causes are excludable"); Turner v. Iowa Fire
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in paid litigation consulting as the expert is in work outside of litigation;96
and 4) "[w]hether the field of expertise claimed by the expert is known to
reach reliable results for the type of opinion" being offered."
Equip. Co., 229 F.3d 1202, 1208 (8th Cir. 2000); Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d
257, 265 (4th Cir. 1999) ("A differential diagnosis that fails to take serious account of other
potential causes may be so lacking that it cannot provide a reliable basis for an opinion on
causation."); Diviero v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 114 F.3d 851, 853 (9th Cir. 1997);
Brown v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig.), 35 F.3d 717, 760 (3d Cir.
1994), rev'd in part sub nom. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 221 F.3d 449 (3d Cir. 2000);
Claar v. Burlington N. R.R., 29 F.3d 499, 502-03 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting expert testimony
where the experts failed "to rule out other possible causes for the injuries plaintiffs com-
plain[ed] of, even though they admitted that this step would be standard procedure before
arriving at a diagnosis" (footnote omitted)); Paul M. da Costa & Melinda Harris, Has Expert
Adequately Accounted for Obvious Alternative Explanations?, in THE DAUBERT COMPENDIUM
301, 303-16 (D.R.I. 2011). But see Heller v. Shaw Indus., 167 F.3d 146, 156 (3d Cir. 1999)
(finding that an expert's testimony "should not be excluded because he or she has failed to
rule out every possible alternative cause of a plaintiffs illness," but should only be ruled out if
he or she fails to rule out obvious alternative explanations (emphasis added)).
96. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note; see Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152
(finding that the purpose of Daubert is to ensure that only reliable and relevant evidence is
admissible and that one way of ensuring this is to make sure that the expert "employs in the
courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the
relevant field"); Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc., 613 F.3d 1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 2010) (adopting the
exact phraseology of Kumho Tire Co.); Wells v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 601 F.3d 375,
378 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152); Boyd v. City & Cnty. of S.F.,
576 F.3d 938, 946 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152); Best v. Lowe's
Home Ctrs., Inc., 563 F.3d 171, 181 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at
152); Jenkins ex rel. Estate of Jenkins v. Bartlett, 487 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing
Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152); Mariposa Farms, L.L.C. v. Westfalia-Surge, Inc., 211 F.
App'x 760, 762 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152); Nimely v. City
of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 396 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152);
Burleson v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 393 F.3d 577, 584 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Kumho
Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152); Zaremba v. Gen. Motors Corp., 360 F.3d 355, 358 (2d Cir. 2004)
(quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152); Goebel v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 346
F.3d 987, 992 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152); Grp. Health Plan,
Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 753, 760 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Rosen v. Ciba-
Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1996)); Lantec, Inc. v. Novell, Inc., 306 F.3d 1003,
1025 (10th Cir. 2002); Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 265-66 (2d
Cir. 2002) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152); Elsayed Mukhtar v. Cal. State Univ.,
Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152),
amended by 319 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2003); Chapman ex rel. Estate of Chapman v. Maytag
Corp., 297 F.3d 682, 688 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Cummins v. Lyle Indus., 93 F.3d 362, 369
(7th Cir. 1996)); Hollander v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193, 1205-06 (10th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152); Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d 194,
203 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152); Jahn v. Equine Servs., P.S.C.,
233 F.3d 382, 388 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152); Elcock v.
Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 746 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152);
SMS Sys. Maint. Servs., Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 188 F.3d II, 25 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting
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2. Relevance
Daubert relevance, in turn, refers to the requisite "fit" between the ex-
pert opinions being offered and the issues in the case. The focus is not the
general reasonableness of a particular methodology, but the reasonableness
of using that methodology to draw a conclusion regarding the particular sub-
ject matter of the case.99 Though it has received far less judicial and scholar-
ly attention than the twin requirement of reliability, the requirement of relev-
ance must be satisfied or expert testimony is subject to exclusion on this ba-
sis alone.'" In fact, the Supreme Court of the United States re-emphasized
Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152); Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308, 311 (5th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152); Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104 F.3d
940, 942 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that whether an "expert is being as careful as he would be in
his regular professional work outside his paid litigation consulting" may be an important
factor (citations omitted)).
97. FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note; see also Kumiho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at
151 ("Daubert's general acceptance factor [does not] help show that an expert's testimony is
reliable where the discipline itself lacks reliability, as, for example, do theories grounded in
any so-called generally accepted principles of astrology or necromancy."); Hendrix ex rel.
G.P., 609 F.3d at 1195 ("[T]he district court must ensure that ... the expert's opinion on gen-
eral causation is 'derived from scientifically valid methodology."' (citations omitted));
McClain, 401 F.3d at 1240 (finding that the expert's testimony was inadmissible because it
was based on "questionable principles of pharmacology"); McEwen v. Bait. Wash. Med. Ctr.
Inc., 404 F. App'x 789, 791 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Happel v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 602
F.3d 820, 825-26 (7th Cir. 2010); Best, 563 F.3d at 178 (citing Hardyman v. Norfolk & W.
Ry. Co., 243 F.3d 255, 260 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Nacchio, 555 F.3d 1234, 1241
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 54 (2009); Polski v. Quigley Corp., 538 F.3d 836, 840 (8th
Cir. 2008) (quoting Polski v. Quigley Corp., No. 04-CV-4199 (PJS/JJG), 2007 WL 2580550,
*5 (D. Minn. Sept. 5, 2007); United States v. Day, 524 F.3d 1361, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 2008);
Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting In re Paoli R.R. Yard
PCB Litig., 35 F.3d at 742); United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151, 161 (2d Cir. 2007);
United States v. Sandoval-Mendoza, 472 F.3d 645, 655 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Ma-
hone, 453 F.3d 68, 71-72 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Fullwood, 342 F.3d 409, 412 (5th
Cir. 2003); Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 263 (4th Cir. 1999); Sterling v.
Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1208 (6th Cir. 1988) (excluding expert testimony based
on "clinical ecolog[y]" because the field consists of "an unproven methodology lacking any
scientific basis in either fact or theory").
98. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993); see Allison v.
McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591).
99. Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 154.
100. See Allison, 184 F.3d at 1312; United States v. Batiste, No. 06-20373-CR, 2007 WL
5303052, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 26, 2007) (citing Allison, 184 F.3d at 1312) (explaining that
there must be a connection between the evidence and the expert's testimony for the testimony
to be relevant under the second prong of the Daubert test); Covas v. Coleman Co., No. 00-
8541-CIV, 2005 WL 6166740, at *1-2 (S.D. Fla. June 27, 2005) (citing Allison, 184 F.3d at
1312) (explaining that there must be a connection between the evidence and the expert's tes-
timony for the testimony to be relevant under the second prong of the Daubert test); see also
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the importance of relevance in its post-Daubert opinion in Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael.'o' In Kumho Tire Co., the Court reiterated that the Federal
Rules of Evidence impose a special obligation on judges to perform the "ga-
tekeeping" function of excluding irrelevant scientific evidence.102
Just months after Kumho Tire Co., the Eleventh Circuit followed and
reinforced this principle in Allison v. McGhan Medical Corp.10 3 There, the
court explained that the Daubert four-factor test "does not operate in a va-
cuum," and that a court's determination of whether scientific evidence is
admissible must be considered against the backdrop of whether the evidence
was also relevant under the Federal Rules of Evidence.'"3 The court empha-
sized that the relevance requirement was especially important in the Daubert
context to ensure that "a barrage of questionable scientific evidence [was not
dumped] on a jury."'05 The court supported its concern by noting that a jury
would be ill-equipped, or at least "less equipped than the judge to make [the
necessary] . .. relevance determinations."'0 Thus, it is particularly crucial
that the judge keep irrelevant scientific evidence out of the jury's purview
"because of its inability to assist in factual determinations, its potential to
create confusion, and its lack of probative value."'
3. Judge as Gatekeeper
The Daubert reforms would mean little without a mechanism of en-
forcement, and here both the Supreme Court of the United States and Con-
gress-by virtue of adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence-have com-
missioned trial judges to serve as "gatekeepers" who must exclude expert
testimony that is not sufficiently reliable or relevant.' 8 A trial judge is em-
Williams v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1360 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (stating that
expert testimony "must have a valid scientific connection to the disputed facts in the case" and
that a judge has the discretion to exclude evidence that has "too great an analytical gap be-
tween the data and the opinion proffered" (citations omitted)).
101. 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
102. Id. at 147.
103. 184 F.3d 1300,1311-12 (1 lth Cir. 1999).
104. Id. at 1309.
105. Id. at 1310.
106. Id.
107. Id. at l311-12.
108. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note ("In Daubert the Court
charged trial judges with the responsibility of acting as gatekeepers to exclude unreliable
expert testimony, and the Court in Kumho clarified that this gatekeeper function applies to all
expert testimony . . . ."); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993);
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999); Surles ex rel. Johnson v. Grey-
hound Lines, Inc., 474 F.3d 288, 295 (6th Cir. 2007) ("Daubert and its progeny have placed
20 [Vol. 36
20
Nova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 2
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol36/iss1/2
A PLEA FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
powered with broad discretion in addressing the reliability and relevance of
expert testimony, and will be upheld on appeal in the absence of an abuse of
that broad discretion.'" In fact, in Allison, the Eleventh Circuit made it a
point to specifically state just how deferential the standard of review for
Daubert rulings is: "After careful but deferential review, we AFFIRM the
district court's Daubert rulings excluding Allison's causation experts, find-
ing that Allison has failed to show that the decision [was] manifestly errone-
ous."o Allison is just one example of how appellate courts generally apply a
very deferential standard of review to Daubert rulings, even if the exclusion
or inclusion of evidence may be outcome-determinative."
4. The Results
The Daubert approach has swept the nation and now controls the ad-
missibility of expert testimony in thirty-three states as well as the federal
courts in all fifty states.1 2 Currently, six states have explicitly adopted Dau-
bert by statute: Delaware,"' Georgia,'l 4 Michigan,"' Mississippi,1 16 North
the district courts in the role of 'gatekeeper,' charging them with evaluating the relevance and
reliability of proffered expert testimony with heightened care."); Schneider ex rel. Estate of
Schneider v. Fried, 320 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 2003) ("[T]he district court acts as a gatekee-
per, preventing opinion testimony that does not meet the requirements of qualification, relia-
bility and fit from reaching the jury."); Duffee ex rel. Thornton v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 91
F.3d 1410, 1411 (10th Cir. 1996) (agreeing with Daubert that judges are empowered to "act as
gatekeepers to ensure that scientific evidence is both relevant and reliable" before it is admit-
ted into evidence (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-95)).
109. See Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152 ("[Tihe trial judge must have considerable
leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert
testimony is reliable."); see also Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146-147 (1997);
Toole v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 235 F.3d 1307, 1312 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Kumho Tire
Co., 526 U.S. at 142); United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1215 (11th Cir. 1999) ("The
trial judge is required to inquire into . . . reliability . . . [and has] 'substantial discretion in
deciding how to test an expert's reliability and whether the expert's relevant testimony is
reliable."' (quoting Forklifts of St. Louis, Inc. v. Komatsu Forklift, USA, Inc., 178 F.3d 1030,
1035 (8th Cir. 1999)).
110. Allison, 184 F.3d at 1322 (emphasis added); see FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory commit-
tee's note ("A review of the caselaw after Daubert shows that the rejection of expert testimo-
ny is the exception rather than the rule.").
Ill. Allison, 184 F.3d at 1306 ("Th[e] deferential standard is not relaxed even though a
ruling on the admissibility of expert evidence may be outcome-determinative.").
112. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597; see infra notes 113-45.
113. DEL. R. EvID. 702 (identical to FED. R. EvID. 702).
114. Mason II, 658 S.E.2d 603, 610 (Ga. 2008) ("Since OCGA § 24-9-67.1(b) was based
on Fed. R. Evid. Rule 702, which in its present form is based on the holdings in Daubert,...
the trial court's application of the standards of Daubert was proper." (citations omitted)).
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Carolina,"' and Vermont.'18  Similarly, twenty-seven states have adopted
Daubert via common law: Alabama," 9 Alaska,12 0 Arkansas,12 1 Colorado, 22
Connecticut,123  Idaho,' 24  Indiana,125  Iowa,126  Kentucky,127  Louisiana,128
115. MICH. R. EvID. 702 (nearly identical to FED. R. EvID. 702). A comment in the Michi-
gan Rules of Evidence states that the:
[A]mendment of MRE 702 ... conforms the Michigan rule to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, as amended effective December 1, 2000, except that the Michigan rule retains the
words "the court determines that" after the word "If' at the outset of the rule. The new lan-
guage requires trial judges to act as gatekeepers who must exclude unreliable expert testimony.
The retained words emphasize the centrality of the court's gatekeeping role in excluding un-
proven expert theories and methodologies from jury consideration.
MICH. R. EvID. 702, staff comment to 2004 amendment (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579;
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999)).
116. Miss. R. EVID. 702 (identical to FED. R. EvID. 702).
117. 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 283, sec. 1.4 (H.B. 542). The North Carolina statute was
signed into law on June 24, 2011, became effective on October 1, 2011, and was codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-702(a)(2011). 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 283, secs. 1.4, 5.2. Prior to the
enactment of the statute, North Carolina had adopted its own test of admissibility. See Hower-
ton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 597 S.E.2d 674, 690 (N.C. 2004) (While "North Carolina cases share
obvious similarities with the principles underlying Daubert, application of the North Carolina
approach is decidedly less mechanistic and rigorous than the 'exacting standards of reliability'
demanded by the federal approach. Moreover, had we ever intended to adopt Daubert and
supersede this established body of North Carolina case law, we would certainly have refe-
renced the basic Daubert factors that have come to define the federal standard. But we did
not." (citations omitted)).
118. VT. R. EVID. 702 (identical to FED. R. EvID.702).
119. Turner v. State (Ex parte State of Alabama), 746 So. 2d 355, 359 (Ala. 1998). Ala-
bama has adopted Daubert for certain types of cases, but remains loyal to Frye in others, and
thus, the state of Alabama is found on both lists. Id. at 359, 361 n.7 ("[T]he Legislature chose
the more flexible admissibility standard established in Daubert" for the admissibility of DNA
evidence, but "[w]ith respect to expert scientific testimony on subjects other than DNA tech-
niques governed by § 36-18-30, Frye remains the standard of admissibility in Alabama.").
120. State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 402 (Alaska 1999) (adopting the Daubert test of admis-
sibility and rejecting Frye).
121. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark. v. Foote, 14 S.W.3d 512, 519 (Ark. 2000) (adopt-
ing the Daubert test of admissibility).
122. See People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68,78 (Colo. 2001) (en banc). The Colorado Supreme
Court has held that trial courts must follow Rule 702 of the Colorado Rules of Evidence
(CRE), and that when applying CRE 702, trial courts can consider the Daubert factors but are
not limited by them. Id. ("[A] trial court making a CRE 702 reliability determination may, but
need not consider any or all of these [Daubert] factors, depending on the totality of the cir-
cumstances of a given case. A trial court may also consider other factors not listed here, to the
extent that it finds them helpful in determining the reliability of the proffered evidence. Our
determination that a trial court may, but need not consider the factors listed in Daubert is
consistent with the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmi-
chael.").
123. State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 742 (Conn. 1997) (adopting the Daubert test of admis-
sibility).
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Maine, 129 Massachusetts, 130 Montana,13' Nebraska,132 Nevada,133 New Hamp-
shire,134 New Jersey,' New Mexico, 3 6 Ohio,' Oklahoma,13 8 Oregon,139
124. See Weeks v. E. Idaho Health Servs., 153 P.3d 1180, 1184 (Idaho 2007) ("The Court
has not adopted the Daubert standard for admissibility of an expert's testimony but has used
some of Daubert's standards in assessing whether the basis of an expert's opinion is scientifi-
cally valid," and has also explicitly rejected Frye's general acceptance test of admissibility.).
125. Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 498 (Ind. 1995) (acknowledging that although
Indiana has not explicitly adopted Daubert, "[t]he concerns driving Daubert coincide with the
express requirement of Indiana Rule of Evidence 702(b) .. . [t]hus, although not binding upon
the determination of state evidentiary law issues, the federal evidence law of Daubert and its
progeny is helpful to the bench and bar in applying Indiana Rule of Evidence 702(b).").
126. Leaf v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 590 N.W.2d 525, 532 (Iowa 1999) (en banc)
(adopting a modified/limited application of Daubert).
127. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, II S.W.3d 575, 577 (Ky. 2000) ("After
careful review . . . we adopt the reasoning of Kumho and hold that Daubert and Mitchell ap-
ply."); Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 908 S.W.2d 100, 101 (Ky. 1995) (adopting the Daubert
test of admissibility), overruled on other grounds, Fugate v. Commonwealth, 993 S.W.2d 931
(Ky. 1999), and abrogated in part by Christian v. Commonwealth, No. 2004-SC-1055-MR,
2005 WL 3500806, at *1 (Ky. Dec. 22, 2005).
128. State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1123 (La. 1993) (adopting the Daubert test of admis-
sibility).
129. See State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 504 (Me. 1978). Although Maine has refused to
officially adopt Daubert, the state's test of admissibility, called the Williams test, is similar to
Daubert. See id. (establishing Maine's standards for the admissibility of expert evidence and
stating that "[t]he controlling criteria regarding the admissibility of expert testimony, so long
as the proffered expert is qualified and probative value is not substantially outweighed by the
factors mentioned in Rule 403, are whether in the sound judgment of the presiding Justice the
testimony to be given is relevant and will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue.").
130. Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1349 (Mass. 1994) ("We accept the
basic reasoning of the Daubert opinion because it is consistent with our test of demonstrated
reliability.").
131. State v. Bieber, 170 P.3d 444, 454 (Mont. 2007) ("[T]his Court has consistently held
since Moore that the Daubert factors apply exclusively to novel scientific evidence."); State v.
Moore, 885 P.2d 457, 470-71 (Mont. 1994), overruled on other grounds, 906 P.2d 697 (Mont.
1995) (adopting the Daubert test of admissibility and acknowledging that the Supreme Court
of Montana had previously rejected the Frye test).
132. City of Lincoln v. Realty Trust Grp., Inc., 705 N.W.2d 432, 436-37 (Neb. 2005)
(reinforcing Nebraska's use of Daubert); Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 631 N.W.2d 862, 876
(Neb. 2001) (adopting the Daubert test of admissibility and rejecting Frye).
133. See Hallmark ex rel. Hallmark v. Eldridge, 189 P.3d 646, 650 (Nev. 2008) ("The
statute governing the admissibility of expert testimony in Nevada district courts is NRS
50.275, which, as we have construed it, tracks Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 702. To date,
however, this court has not adopted the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of FRE
702 in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. But, as we have stated, Daubert and
the federal court decisions discussing it may provide persuasive authority in determining
whether expert testimony should be admitted in Nevada courts." (footnotes omitted)).
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Rhode Island,140 South Dakota,'4 1 Tennessee,142 Texas, 43 West Virginia,'"
and Wyoming.145
134. Baker Valley Lumber, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 813 A.2d 409, 415 (N.H. 2002)
("Today, we apply the Daubert standard to New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 702.").
135. State v. Harvey, 699 A.2d 596, 621 (N.J. 1997). New Jersey has partially accepted
and partially rejected Daubert in different types of cases. See id. ("Even before the United
States Supreme Court decided Daubert, this Court had relaxed the test for admissibility of
scientific evidence in toxic-tort cases. We have been cautious in expanding the more relaxed
standard to other contexts. Thus, the test in criminal cases remains whether the scientific
community generally accepts the evidence." (citations omitted)).
136. State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192, 203 (N.M. 1993) (rejecting Frye and adopting the
Daubert factors for "assessing the validity of a particular technique to determine if it is 'scien-
tific knowledge' under [New Mexico's evidence] Rule 702" (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 597, 593-95 (1993))).
137. See Miller v. Bike Athletic Co., 687 N.E.2d 735, 741 (Ohio 1998) (citing to Daubert
when determining the admissibility of expert testimony, but never explicitly adopting the
Daubert standard); State v. Williams, 446 N.E.2d 444, 447 n.5 (Ohio 1983) (acknowledging
that Ohio never adopted the Frye test and finding that the Frye test has been widely criticized
and rejected by many commentators and courts).
138. Christian v. Gray, 65 P.3d 591, 600 (Okla. 2003) ("Our Court of Criminal Appeals
has already adopted Daubert for criminal proceedings in Oklahoma Courts. Today we like-
wise adopt Daubert and Kumho as appropriate standards for Oklahoma trial courts in deciding
the admissibility of expert testimony in civil matters."); Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319, 328
(Okla. Crim. App. 1995) ("We ... believe the time is right for this Court to abandon the Frye
test and adopt the more structured and yet flexible admissibility standard set forth in Dau-
bert.").
139. State v. O'Key, 899 P.2d 663, 680 (Or. 1995) (in banc) (finding that Daubert is con-
sistent with Oregon's leading case, State v. Brown, and further finding that Daubert should be
instructive to Oregon courts); State v. Brown, 687 P.2d 751, 759 (Or. 1984) (in banc) (reject-
ing Frye and outlining seven factors courts should consider when determining the admissibili-
ty of expert evidence).
140. Owens v. Silvia, 838 A.2d 881, 890 (R.I. 2003) ("Although we declined to expressly
adopt the standards outlined in the United States Supreme Court decision of Daubert v. Mer-
rell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., we drew guidance from the principles of that case." (citations
omitted)); Raimbeault v. Takeuchi Mfg. (U.S.), 772 A.2d 1056, 1061 (R.I. 2001) (per curiam)
(recognizing the applicability of Daubert in cases proposing the use of scientific evidence and
applying R.I. R. Evid. 702).
141. See Burley v. Kytec Innovative Sports Equip., Inc., 737 N.W.2d 397, 406 (S.D. 2007)
(reaffirming South Dakota's reliance on the Daubert test); State v. Hofer, 512 N.W.2d 482,
484 (S.D. 1994) (adopting the Daubert test of admissibility).
142. McDaniel v. CSX Transp., Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 265 (Tenn. 1997) (rejecting Frye,
and although not expressly adopting Daubert, noting that the Daubert factors are useful in
determining the admissibility of expert testimony).
143. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Tex. 1995)
(adopting Daubert and stating that "[wie are persuaded by the reasoning in Daubert and
Kelly"); Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 572-73 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc) (rejecting
the Frye test of admissibility and providing a list of relevant factors to be considered when
determining the admissibility of expert evidence).
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Twelve states and the District of Columbia have refused to adopt the
Daubert test of admissibility and instead have chosen to follow the outdated
Frye test: Alabama, 14 6 Arizona,147 California,14 8 District of Columbia,149 Flor-
ida, Illinois,iso Kansas,151 Maryland,15 2 Minnesota,153 New York,154 North
144. San Francisco v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc., 656 S.E.2d 485, 492-94 (W. Va. 2007) (reaf-
firming West Virginia's continued use of the Daubert test of admissibility); Gentry v. Man-
gum, 466 S.E.2d 171, 179 (W. Va. 1995) (rejecting the Frye test of admissibility); Wilt v.
Buracker (In re Estate of Nickelson), 443 S.E.2d 196, 203 (W. Va. 1993) (adopting the Dau-
bert test of admissibility and concluding "that Daubert's analysis of Federal Rule 702 should
be followed in analyzing the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702 of the West
Virginia Rules of Evidence").
145. Cooper v. State, 174 P.3d 726, 728 (Wyo. 2008) (acknowledging the continued use of
the Daubert test of admissibility); Bunting ex rel. Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467, 471
(Wyo. 1999) (adopting the Daubert test of admissibility and stating that "Daubert and its
progeny [should be] guidance for the Wyoming courts' determination whether to admit or
exclude expert testimony").
146. Turner v. State (Exparte State of Alabama), 746 So. 2d 355, 359, 361 n.7 (Ala. 1998)
("[T]he Legislature chose the more flexible admissibility standard established in Daubert" for
the admissibility of DNA evidence, but "[w]ith respect to expert scientific testimony on sub-
jects other than DNA techniques governed by § 36-18-30, Frye remains the standard of ad-
missibility in Alabama.").
147. Logerquist v. McVey, I P.3d 113, 125 (Ariz. 2000) (en banc) (continuing to use the
Frye test of admissibility and stating that "we have left no doubt whether Ariz. R. Evid. 702
was intended to abolish the Frye doctrine, for we have continued to apply Frye"); State v.
Tankersley, 956 P.2d 486, 491 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc) (refusing to abandon Frye).
148. People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 323 (Cal. 1994) (in bank) (refusing to abandon the
Kelly/Frye test); People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976) (adopting the Frye test of
admissibility and altering it slightly).
149. Jones v. United States, 990 A.2d 970, 977 (D.C. 2010) (continuing to apply the Frye
test of admissibility).
150. People v. McKown, 875 N.E.2d 1029, 1036 (111. 2007) (finding that while "[i]n Illi-
nois, the application of the Frye standard is limited to scientific methodology that is consi-
dered 'new' or 'novel,"' the test is still very much the standard); People v. Miller, 670 N.E.2d
721, 731 (Ill. 1996) ("Illinois follows the Frye standard for the admission of novel scientific
evidence.").
151. Kuhn ex rel. Estate of Bishop v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 14 P.3d 1170, 1181-82 (Kan.
2000) (listing the long lineage of Kansas cases applying the Frye test of admissibility).
152. Blackwell v. Wyeth, 971 A.2d 235, 247-48 (Md. 2009) (continuing to apply the Frye
test); Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 372 (Md. 1978) (adopting the Frye test of admissibility).
153. State v. MacLennan, 702 N.W.2d 219, 230 (Minn. 2005) (continuing to apply the
Frye standard); Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 810-14 (Minn. 2000) (thoroughly
analyzing the Frye standard as compared to the new federal Daubert standard and determining
that Minnesota still uses the Frye test of admissibility).
154. People v. LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d 374, 379 (N.Y. 2007) (continuing to apply the Frye
test of admissibility).
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Dakota, 55 Pennsylvania,'56 and Washington.'5 ' There are also five states that
have adopted their own test of admissibility: Hawaii,1 8 Missouri,'59 South
Carolina,'6 Utah,16' and Virginia.162 At this point, the only southern state
other than Florida that follows Frye is Alabama, and even Alabama has rec-
ognized the use of Daubert in certain contexts.16 3
155. State v. Hernandez, 707 N.W.2d 449, 453 (N.D. 2005) (refusing to adopt Daubert);
City of Fargo v. McLaughlin, 512 N.W.2d 700, 704 (N.D. 1994) (finding that the Frye test of
admissibility applies).
156. Grady v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038, 1044 (Pa. 2003) (taking a careful look at
Daubert, but ultimately deciding to continue to follow Frye).
157. Anderson v. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc., No. 82264-6, 2011 WL 3930205, at *4
(Wash. Sept. 8, 2011) (en banc) ("In civil cases, we have neither expressly adopted Frye nor
expressly rejected Daubert."); State v. Copeland, 922 P.2d 1304, 1310 (Wash. 1996) (en banc)
(adhering to the Frye test and declining to adopt Daubert); Reese v. Stroh, 907 P.2d 282, 286
(Wash. 1995) (en banc) (declining to adopt Daubert).
158. See State v. Vliet, 19 P.3d 42, 53 (Haw. 2001). Hawaii is unique, in that, it has nei-
ther rejected Frye, nor adopted Daubert, yet it follows both cases in certain types of cases.
See id. ("[T]his court has not adopted the Daubert test, and we expressly refrain from doing
so. However, because the HRE are patterned on the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), con-
struction of the federal counterparts of the HRE by the federal courts is instructive, but ob-
viously not binding on our courts." (citations omitted)).
159. See State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d 146,
153 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). The Missouri Supreme Court has made it clear that Missouri fol-
lows its own unique test of admissibility. See id. (stating that the Missouri Supreme Court
"expressly holds that to the extent that cases since Lasky have suggested that the standard of
admissibility of expert testimony in civil cases is that set forth in Frye or some other standard,
they are no longer to be followed. The relevant standard is that set out in section 490.065.").
160. See State v. Council, 515 S.E.2d 508, 518 (S.C. 1999), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2770
(2009) ("While this Court does not adopt Daubert, we find the proper analysis for determining
admissibility of scientific evidence is now under the SCRE. When admitting scientific evi-
dence under Rule 702, SCRE, the trial judge must find the evidence will assist the trier of fact,
the expert witness is qualified, and the underlying science is reliable. The trial judge should
apply the Jones factors to determine reliability.").
161. See Alder v. Bayer Corp., AGFA Div., 61 P.3d 1068, 1083 (Utah 2002) (rejecting the
exclusive use of Frye, and declining to adopt Daubert, but instead adopting its own test of
admissibility governed by its rules of evidence and the case of State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d
388, 396-99 (Utah 1989)).
162. John v. Wong Shik, 559 S.E.2d 694, 698 (Va. 2002) ("[W]e have not previously
considered the question whether the Daubert analysis employed by the federal courts should
be applied in our trial courts to determine the scientific reliability of expert testimony [and],
[tiherefore, we leave this question open for future consideration.").
163. See Turner v. State (Ex parte State of Alabama), 746 So. 2d 355, 359-61 (Ala. 1998).
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B. Daubert's Utility in Professional Liability Cases
The Daubert analysis has particular significance in complex medical
malpractice cases.'6 As expert evidence becomes increasingly intricate, our
judges and juries become increasingly vulnerable to bad science. The Frye
general acceptance test exacerbates this vulnerability because of its extreme
relativism.165 Under Frye, every expert conclusion is worthy of jury consid-
eration as long as it has some underlying link to a generally accepted metho-
dology. 166 Frye has even been read by the Supreme Court of Florida as pro-
hibiting a trial judge from considering an expert's application of scientific
principles to the facts at hand, as long as the expert purports to rely on scien-
tific principles that are generally accepted. 167
Medical causation is one of the areas where the shortcomings of Frye
are most evident.'6" A causation expert only needs to attribute his or her opi-
nions to the generally accepted methodology of differential diagnosis to
avoid an admissibility issue.169 This can literally be as blatant as an expert
testifying that he or she considered other possible causes and simply finds
164. See Gelsthorpe ex rel. Bacus v. Weinstein, 897 So. 2d 504, 511 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2005) (finding that in a medical malpractice case that the expert's pure opinion testimo-
ny does not even have to be based on his or her experience with patients suffering from the
same injuries, but that the opinion can be based on the expert's "experience treating similar
patients" (quoting FLA. STAT. § 766.102(5)(a)(1) (2003))).
165. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
166. Id.
167. See Castillo v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 854 So. 2d 1264, 1276 (Fla. 2003)
("By considering the extrapolation of the data from the admittedly acceptable experiments, the
Third District went beyond the requirements of Frye, which assesses only the validity of the
underlying science. Frye does not require the court to assess the application of the expert's
raw data in reaching his or her conclusion. We therefore conclude that the Third District
erroneously assessed the Castillos' expert testimony under Frye by considering not just the
underlying science, but the application of the data generated from that science in reaching the
expert's ultimate conclusion." (emphasis added)).
168. See, e.g., Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 548 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam); Gelsthorpe
ex rel. Bacus, 897 So. 2d at 510; Castillo, 854 So. 2d at 1271.
169. See Castillo, 854 So. 2d at 1271 ("It is well-settled that an expert's use of differential
diagnosis to arrive at a specific causation opinion is a methodology that is generally accepted
in the relevant scientific community." (citations omitted)); see also Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 549
(repeating that the Supreme Court of Florida previously held in Castillo "that differential
diagnosis is a generally accepted method for determining specific causation"); Gelsthorpe ex
rel. Bacus, 897 So. 2d at 510 ("[U]se of the technique of differential diagnosis by an expert
medical witness in determining causation does not raise concerns under Frye. Differential
diagnosis is an established scientific methodology in which the expert eliminates possible
causes of a medical condition to arrive at the conclusion as to the actual cause of the condi-
tion." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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them inapplicable.170 It is no secret that the medical malpractice litigant who
could not otherwise meet the greater weight of the evidence (i.e. more-likely-
than-not) standard of causationl71 can likely evade this proof problem with an
expert who cloaks his or her opinions in a differential diagnosis.17 2 And if
that fails, as the dissent in Marsh recognized, an expert only needs to couch
testimony as "pure opinion," which is essentially "always admissible" based
merely on a purported expert's "training and experience."l 7 3
As discussed above, the Daubert approach would provide a much more
rigorous system for ensuring that our judges and juries decide cases involv-
ing complex professional liability issues based on good science.174 One of
the fundamental tenets of Daubert is the rejection of the ipse dixit expert
opinion.175 The phrase "because I said so" may never lose its cherished place
in the parenting lexicon, but under Daubert, it has rightfully lost any validat-
170. See, e.g., Castillo, 854 So. 2d at 1270-71 (ending discussion of the parties' experts'
"disagree[ments] about the conclusions" from available data and information on the basis that,
"[c]learly, the Castillos' experts did utilize differential diagnosis, and as amici admit, this was
a generally accepted method for addressing specific medical causation" (citations omitted)).
171. See, e.g., Gooding ex rel. Estate of Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d
1015, 1018 (Fla. 1984) ("Florida courts follow the more likely than not standard of causation
and require proof that the negligence probably caused the plaintiffs injury. Prosser explored
this standard of proof as follows: '[T]he plaintiff . .. has the burden of proof . .. [and] must
introduce evidence . . . that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a
substantial factor in bringing about the result. A mere possibility of such causation is not
enough; and when ... the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the
court to direct a verdict for the defendant."' (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 41, at 241 (4th ed. 1971)) (emphasis added)); see also Jackson Cnty. Hosp. Corp. v.
Aldrich ex rel. Estate of Roddenberry, 835 So. 2d 318, 328 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002)
("The 'more likely than not' standard is satisfied ... if a plaintiff presents evidence that estab-
lishes that the decedent had a fifty-one percent or better chance that [a loss] would not have
occurred but for the actions or lack thereof of the medical care provider." (citations omitted)).
172. See, e.g., Castillo, 854 So. 2d at 1271, 1277. The problem is further confounded by
Florida's evidence code, which makes it extremely difficult to cross-examine such an expert
with external material such as treatises or studies unless the expert recognizes the source of
the contrary material as authoritative. See FLA. STAT. § 90.706 (2011); see also Whitfield v.
State, 859 So. 2d 529, 530 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (per curiam) (disallowing the defen-
dant's use of a medical article to cross-examine the prosecution's expert witness because
although the expert conceded that the medical journal itself was generally accepted in the
medical community, the expert refused to recognize that the specific article was generally
accepted or authoritative).
173. See Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 560, 562 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
174. See supra notes 164-73 and accompanying text.
175. See McClain v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1244 (11th Cir. 2005) (rejecting
"expert's assurances . .. [of] utiliz[ing] generally accepted scientific methodology [as] insuffi-
cient. [Because] [s]uch statements can spring just as quickly from the ipse dixit of the expert .
. . [and] nothing in ... Daubert ... requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is
connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert" (citations omitted)).
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ing power when uttered by an expert. 176 Without intending to suggest that
medical doctors are more prone to resort to "because I said so" than other
types of experts, it is nonetheless obvious that the methodology of differen-
tial diagnosis has no built-in safeguards to catch the ipse dixit opinion and,
indeed, almost invites it.177 The Daubert approach corrects this shortcoming
and would improve the quality of expert evidence in professional liability
cases across the board.17 8
IV. CALL TO ACTION: FLORIDA'S ADOPTION OF A STATUTORY DAUBERT
STANDARD
The Florida Legislature has made two recent attempts in 2008 and 2011
to amend Florida's Evidence Code to adopt a Daubert standard.'79 In both
years, both houses filed bills which would have empowered Florida's capa-
ble trial judges with the same combination of specific guidance, procedural
tools, and gate-keeping discretion that has worked well at the federal level
and in the states following Daubert.'80 The 2011 legislation would have im-
plemented Daubert by amending sections 90.702 and 90.704, Florida Sta-
tutes in the following respects. 181
Section I engrafted the essentials of Daubert onto section 90.702 of the
Florida Evidence Code by requiring as a condition of admissibility that ex-
pert evidence be based upon sufficient facts or data, be the product of relia-
ble principles and methods, and that the principles and methods be applied
176. See id. ("The trial court's gatekeeping function requires more than simply 'taking the
expert's word for it."' (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note)); see, e.g., Hen-
drix ex rel. G.P. v. Evenflo Co., 609 F.3d 1183, 1201 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Frazi-
er, 387 F.3d 1244, 1261 (11th Cir. 2004); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311,
1319 (9th Cir. 1995); FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
177. See Castillo, 854 So. 2d at 1271; cf Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1315.
178. See McClain, 401 F.3d at 1244; Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1315, 1319.
179. See Fla. SB 822 (2011); Fla. HB 391 (2011); Fla. HB 645 (2008); Fla. SB 1448
(2008). The legislature has also proposed two bills for the 2012 legislative session: Florida
House of Representatives Proposed Committee Bill 243 and Florida Senate Proposed Com-
mittee Bill 378. Fla. H.R. Comm. on, PCB 243 (draft of Sept. 29, 2011) (proposed FLA. STAT.
§§ 90.702, .704); Fla. S. Comm. on, PCB 378 (draft of Sept. 29, 2011) (proposed FLA. STAT.
§§ 90.702, .704). These two 2012 bills are substantially similar and are written to take effect
on July 1, 2012. Compare Fla. H.R. Comm. on, PCB 243, with Fla. S. Comm. on, PCB 378.
The bills contain no provision for a pretrial Daubert hearing and do not require written find-
ings and conclusions. See generally Fla. H.R. Comm. on, PCB 243; Fla. S. Comm. on, PCB
378.
180. See Fla. SB 822; Fla. HB 391; Fla. HB 645; Fla. SB 1448.
181. Fla. SB 822; Fla. HB 391.
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reliably to the facts of the case.'82 Section 1 expressly adopted Daubert and
its significant progeny and rejected Frye and all of its Florida progeny by
adding the following language to section 90.702(2):
The courts of this state shall interpret and apply the requirements
of subsection (1) and [section] 90.704 in accordance with Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Gen-
eral Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); [and] Kumho Tire
Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) .... Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) and subsequent Florida deci-
sions applying or implementing Frye no longer apply to subsection
(1) or [section] 90.704.183
Section 2 addressed the too common use of experts as conduits for evi-
dence that would otherwise be inadmissible, by amending section 90.704 to
require that before otherwise inadmissible facts or data are disclosed to a jury
through expert evidence, the trial judge must make a finding that the proba-
tive value of the facts or data in assisting the jury's evaluation of expert evi-
dence substantially outweighs the prejudicial effect of the facts or data."
This is consistent with the Daubert conceptualization of the trial judge as
gatekeeper and with ensuring the trustworthiness of evidence that reaches a
jury through an expert.185
The 2008 bills, unlike the 2011 legislation, would have also amended
sections 90.705 and 90.707, Florida Statutes.'86 Section 90.705 would have
allowed a party to have a Daubert hearing upon a timely motion, to require
the trial court to set forth its findings of facts and conclusions of law, and to
permit an interlocutory discretionary appeal of the admission or exclusion of
182. Fla. SB 822; Fla. HB 391.
183. Fla. SB 822; Fla. HB 391. This precise language was not in the 2008 legislation.
Fla. SB 1448; Fla. HB 645. The 2008 legislation included much broader language:
The courts of this state shall interpret and apply the requirements of [sections] 90.702 and
90.704 in a manner consistent with Rules 702 and 703, Federal Rules of Evidence, and with all
United States Supreme Court case law interpreting those rules in effect at the time of enact-
ment of this provision.
Fla. SB 1448; Fla. HB 645.
184. Fla. SB 822; Fla. HB 391.
185. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
186. Compare Fla. SB 1448 (2008) (amending section 90.705 and creating section 90.707
of the Florida Statutes), and Fla. HB 645 (2008) (amending section 90.705 and creating sec-
tion 90.707 of the Florida Statutes), with Fla. SB 822 (2011) (disregarding sections 90.705
and 90.707 of the Florida Statutes), and Fla. HB 391 (2011) (disregarding sections 90.705 and
90.707 of the Florida Statutes).
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expert testimony with the criteria for the appellate court to consider in
whether to grant such an appeal."'
The passages of bills similar to those proposed in 2008 and 2011 would
immediately put Florida on par with the federal system, where, incidentally,
Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703 were themselves amended in 2000 to
codify Daubert and its progeny.'88 The proposed Florida legislation would in
effect import the synthesized federal approach, i.e., amended FRE 702 and
703, into Florida law.'89 In the next part, we discuss the provisions of a pro-
posed bill should the 2012 Legislature decide to tackle Frye.
V. A STEP TOWARDS ACTION: A PROPOSED BILL
The authors set forth the following proposed bill to implement Daubert.
Words stricken are deletions; words underlined are additions.
Section 1. Section 90.702, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:
90.702 Testimony by experts.-
(1) If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will as-
sist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determin-
ing a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education may testify about it in the
form of an opinion, or otherwise, if:
(a) The testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(b) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and me-
thods;and
187. Fla. SB 1448; Fla. HB 645. Sections 4, 6, and 7 of the 2008 legislation were "nuts
and bolts" provisions relating to numbering, severability, and the act's effective date. Id. The
2011 legislation did not include severability or numbering provisions and its effective date
section-unlike the 2008 bills-was silent on its application to pending cases. Compare Fla.
SB 822 (2011), and Fla. HB 391 (2011), with Fla. SB 1448 (2008), and Fla. HB 645 (2008).
188. FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note; see FED. R. EviD. 703 advisory com-
mittee's note.
189. See Fla. SB 822; Fla. HB 391; FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note; FED. R.
EvID. 703 advisory committee's note.
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(c) The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to
the facts of the casei b
can be applied to the evidene at tr-ial. 1 90
(2) The courts of this state shall interpret and apply the require-
ments of subsection (1) and section 90.704 in accordance with
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993) and its progeny as well as in a manner consistent with Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, and all Supreme Court of the
United States case law interpreting those rules.
Section 2. Section 90.704, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:
90.704 Basis of opinion testimony by experts. -The facts or data
upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those
perceived by, or made known to, the expert at or before the trial.
If the facts or data are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts
in the subject to support the opinion expressed, the facts or data
need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or infe-
rence to be admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible
shall not be disclosed to a iury by the proponent of the opinion or
inference unless the court determines that the probative value in
assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially
outweighs the prejudicial effect.192
Section 3. Section 90.705, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:
90.705 Disclosure of facts or data underlying expert opinion.-
(1) Unless otherwise required by the court, an expert may testify
in terms of opinion or inferences and give reasons without prior
190. Fla. SB 822; Fla. HB 391. The 2008 bills-HB 645, SB 1448-included a paragraph
which stated: "An expert may only offer expert testimony with respect to a particular field in
which the expert is qualified." Fla. SB 1448; Fla. HB 645. Based on the fact that current
Florida common and statutory law still upholds this bedrock principle, this provision was
superfluous and has been omitted here. See FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (2011); Fla. SB 822 (2011);
Fla. HB 391 (2011). Subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) mirror the language used in FED. R. EVID.
702. Fla. SB 822; Fla. HB 391; FED. R. EVID. 702.
191. Fla. SB 822. The 2011 bills contained a paragraph explicitly rejecting Frye and all
Florida decisions applying or implementing Frye. See id.; Fla. HB 391. In light of the clear
language of this paragraph, such language is not necessary and has not been included here.
See Fla. SB 822.
192. Fla. SB 1448. This added language mirrors Federal Rule of Evidence 703. FED. R.
EvID. 703.
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disclosure of the underlying facts or data. On cross-examination
the expert shall be required to specify the facts or data.'9 3
(2) Upon timely motion of a party, the court shall hold a hearing
prior to trial to determine whether an expert's proposed testimony,
including pure opinion testimony, satisfies the requirements of sec-
tions 90.702 and 90.704.194 The trial court's ruling shall set forth
written findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which the or-
der to admit or exclude expert testimony is based.195 PriEr-4E-4he
Sitet ing Ithe opinion, a paty against hom the apiion rein
f n erso fred may ancdut a heir dire examination of the wit
ness direted to the underlying fats O data fof the Witness'S pi
nion. if the party establishes pfimna facie evidence that the exper
does not have a Suffi ient baSiS fOr the Opiion, the opinions and
in.ferences of the epert are inadmissible unless the party offeving
the testimony establishes the unr'derlying facts Or data.a96
Section 6. If any provision of this act or the application thereof
to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does
not affect other provisions or applications of the act that can be
given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to
193. Fla. SB 1448.
194. Id. Pre-trial Daubert hearings will allow judges the time to closely review the relev-
ance and reliability of the proposed testimony and the expert's credentials and to make an
informed decision as to its admissibility. See id. Allowing the scheduling of a Daubert hear-
ing prior to trial reduces the risk of a trial by ambush arising from the late disclosure or non-
disclosure of experts. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Cts., HB 645 (2008) Staff Analysis 2-4 (Mar.
10, 2008) [hereinafter Comm. on Cts., HB 645 Staff Analysis], available at http://archive
.fl senate. gov/datalsessionl2008/Houselbi s/anal ysis/pdfhO645.CTS.pdf. It also will provide
litigants with a preview of the strength of their opponents' cases, which may encourage set-
tlement or support disposition on summary judgment. See id.
195. Fla. SB3 1448. Written findings will create a sufficient record to enable and facilitate
appellate review. See id.
196. Id. The 2008 bills contained a provision establishing the standard of rcview on ap-
peal for the court's admission or exclusion of expert testimony (de novo), see e.g., Brim v.
State, 695 So. 2d 268, 274 (Fla. 1997), and a new avenue for interlocutory appeal under cer-
tain limited circumstances. Fla. SB 1448. While such a provision was certainly forward-
thinking, it ignored the current realities of the Florida court system. See id. Such a provision
could not only potentially extend the life of cases causing additional congestion of trial and
appellate court dockets, but it could also delay justice for both plaintiffs and defendants. See
id. Unless and until there is a proper vetting of this type of provision by the State Courts
Administrator, the authors would discourage such a provision. Additionally, because article
V, section 4(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution provides that courts may hear interlocutory
appeals as provided by rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida, such a provision may
be an unconstitutional encroachment on the exclusive rulemaking authority of the Supreme
Court of the United States. See FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 4(b)(1).
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this end the provisions of this act are declared severable and shall
remain valid and enforceable.197
Section 7. This act shall take effect July 1, 2012, and shall apply
to all actions commenced on or after the effective date. 98
VI. CONCLUSION
It is clear that Florida has spent too long on the outside of the Daubert
revolution looking in. The divergence between Florida's state court-where
Frye is still law, and federal courts-where Daubert is followed, only makes
things worse.' 99 In cases where a plaintiff needs the help of "junk science," it
is all too common for a Florida resident-be it an individual or company-to
be sued in a matter that chiefly involves an out-of-state defendant primarily
for the reason that the plaintiffs attorney wants to prevent the case from
being removed to federal court because of a preference for Frye-which is
equivalent to no standard at all-over Daubert.200 The Florida Evidence
Code was statutorily created, and it is the legislature's responsibility to see
that the judiciary properly handles expert evidence. 20 ' The legislature can
fulfill this responsibility, to the benefit of Florida's justice system and all of
its citizens, by enacting a statutory Daubert standard like the one proposed
above.
197. Fla. SB 1448.
198. The 2008 bills contained language which would have applied the Daubert standard
retroactively "to all pending actions in which trial . . . commences more than [ninety] calendar
days after that date." Fla. SB 1448 (2008); Fla. HB 645 (2011). In order to avoid any argu-
ment that this provision would be unconstitutional and to foreclose the floodgate of litigation
over this issue, the authors have dropped any language of retroactivity.
199. See Comm. on Cts., HB 645 Staff Analysis, supra note 194, at 2-3.
200. See id. at 2-4. The federal courts have "diversity jurisdiction" in matters involving
citizens of different states only if none of the defendants is a citizen of Florida. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (2006).
201. See Comm. on Cts., HB 645 Staff Analysis, supra note 194, at 2-3.
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